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Abstract 
 
The idea of deducing legal rulings in Islamic law, or ijtihād, as well as the qualifications 
of the person who practices ijtihād, known as the mujtahid, has been a complex issue among 
Muslim ʿulamāʾ for centuries. Many Muslim ʿulamāʾ and Western scholars have maintained that 
the gate of ijtihād was closed. The title of mujtahid was therefore impossible to attain. The 
Moroccan intellectual al-Khamlīshī maintains that the strenuous conditions put forth by some of 
the Sunni jurists to qualify an individual to become a mujtahid actually contributed to the demise 
of ijtihād. These qualifications, according to al-Khamlīshī, were proven to be unachievable and 
stood as myriad obstacles in creating new generations to reform the old Islamic fiqh. This essay 
shows that, despite the extremely strenuous set of qualifications, through the writings of al-
Khamlīshī, Moroccan women penetrated men’s domain in Islamic family law, breaking the long-
standing monopoly men held therein.  
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Introduction 
     
The idea of deducing legal rulings in Islamic law, or ijtihād, as well as the qualifications 
of the person who practices ijtihād, known as the mujtahid, has been a complex issue among 
Muslim ʿulamāʾ for centuries. Many Muslim ʿulamāʾ and Western scholars have maintained that 
the gate of ijtihād was closed after the formation of the Islamic schools of law (madhāhib). The 
title of mujtahid was therefore impossible to attain.1 Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī, a Moroccan intellectual, 
maintains that the strenuous conditions put forth by some of the Sunni jurists to qualify an 
individual to become a mujtahid actually contributed to the demise of ijtihād. These qualifications, 
according to al-Khamlīshī, were proven to be unachievable and stood as myriad obstacles in 
creating new generations to reform the old Islamic substantive law (fiqh). This essay shows that, 
despite the extremely strenuous set of qualifications set in place for an individual to become a 
legislator (mujtahid), through the writings of al-Khamlīshī, Moroccan women penetrated men’s 
domain in Islamic family law, breaking the long-standing monopoly men held therein. Most 
importantly, for the first time Moroccan women were publicly practicing ijtihād—a legal process 
that was once not only considered the realm of men exclusively, but was also seen as impossible 
to attain by anyone after the establishment of the Sunni Islamic schools of law in the tenth century.  
Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī is one of the most prominent Moroccan scholars who has written 
extensively on the Moroccan Personal Status Law (Mudawwanat al-Usra) and the rights of women 
in Islamic substantive law.2 Al-Khamlīshī authored a dozen books on Islamic law and the 
Moroccan Mudawwana. He was born in a small village in the Bedouin region of al-Ḥusayma in 
Northern Morocco in 1935.3 Al-Khamlīshī was influenced by his father, a religious man and a 
                                                          
1 A mujtahid is an individual engaged in the process of deducing legal rulings (ijtihād). Wael Hallaq debunked the 
idea that the “Gate of Ijtihad” was closed in practice, at least until the Ottoman period. See Wael Hallaq, "Was the 
Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" International Journal of Middle East Studies 16:1 (1984):3-41. 
2 See Dār al-Ḥadīth Institution’s website at http://www.edhh.org/cv-directeur.php. 
3 For more on the life of al-Khamlīshī see his interview on al-Raḥma TV channel at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xk9pCXcnTx4. 
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member of the Sufi order al-Nāsrīya.4 Raised in an Islamic traditional conservative household, al-
Khamlīshī memorized the Qurʾān at the age of ten.5 Later in his life, al-Khamlīshī worked as a 
judge in the Moroccan Court of Appeal from 1960-1970 and served as a law professor at the 
University of Muḥammad V, Souissi from 1971-2000. He was appointed to head the famous 
religious-conservative university, the Institution of Dār al-Ḥadīth al-Ḥassanīa from 2000 until the 
present.6 Al-Khamlīshī was selected twice by the latest kings of Morocco to be a member of the 
committee commissioned to reform the Moroccan Mudawwana in 1993 and in 2004.7  
In criticizing Islamic substantive law, Khamlīshī argues for reforming some of the outdated 
Islamic rulings using the method of ijtihād, where ijtihād takes into consideration social and 
economic factors of the time.8 He is of the opinion that while some Islamic rulings are founded on 
certain written evidence—from the Qurʾān and the Sunna (conduct) of the Prophet—other rulings 
were based on the ijtihād of the jurists.9 The latter type of ruling, according to al-Khamlīshī, could 
be reformed if it was discovered that the rulings failed to execute the objectives of Sharīʿa (maqāṣid 
al-sharīʿa) due to the change in time, custom, tradition, or the region’s political and economic 
systems.10 Al-Khamlīshī goes on to state that Sharīʿa was revealed to protect the rights of the 
individual and to maintain these rights without transgressing those of others, according to the 
Qurʾanic injunction, Q. 16: 90, "Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith 
and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion.”11 Therefore, if the Islamic 
ruling does not achieve the objectives of Sharīʿa, according to al-Khamlīshī, it should be ignored 
even if jurists reached consensus (ijmāʿ) in the matter.12  
Al-Khamlīshī argues that fiqh students of today believe that ijtihād was limited to the four 
madhāhib and ended by the death of the eponyms of these madhāhib.13 This belief was due to the 
opinion of the majority of the ʿulamāʾ, who decided that the gate of ijtihād is closed, and that the 
only madhhab that should be practiced in Morocco is the Mālikī, from which no one should 
deviate.14 Further, al-Khamlīshī maintains that these ʿulamāʾ and their students believe that only 
the absolute mujtahid (al-mujtahid al-muṭlaq) may exercise ijtihād, however, they believe that 
these mujtahids do not exist at the present time.15 Al-Khamlīshī concludes that Moroccan society 
is left with judges who are imitators of past jurists.16 Some of these judges, according to al-
Khamlīshī, cherish imitation (taqlīd) and consider it a sacred tradition. Al-Khamlīshī argues that 
because of imitation, judges’ gauge of what constitutes right from wrong becomes closely tied to 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Muḥammad al-Kashbūr, Qānūn al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣīya (al-Dār al-Bayḍāʾ, Maṭbaʿat al-Najāḥ al-Jadīda, 1993), 22. 
See also  http://www.edhh.org/cv-directeur.php. 
8 Ibid. Ijtihād is the process of legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the jurist-mujtahid derives or 
rationalize law on the bases of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. For more on ijtihād, see Wael B. Hallaq, Authority 
Continuity and change in Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24-56. 
9 Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī, Wijhat naẓar: Point of view (Al-Dār Al-Bayḍāʾ: Maṭbaʿat al-najāḥ al-jadīdah, 1988), 13. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Khamlīshī, Wijhat naẓar, 13. Throughout the article I use Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qurʾān ([Washington, D.C.]: 
Khalil Al-Rawaf, 1946]). 
12 Khamlīshī, Wijhat naẓar, 13. 
13 Ibid., 32. 
14 Ibid. 
15  For more on the qualifications of the mujtahids see Hallaq, “Authority”, 2001, 24-56. 
16 Al-Khamlīshī, Wijhat naẓar, 32-33.  
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agreeing or disagreeing with past jurists.17 Most significantly, al-Khamlīshī is critical of Islamic 
fiqh which suffers, according to him, from the same disease as that of the court system of 
Morocco—that of being outdated.18 
 
Collective Ijtihād (Al-Ijtihād al-Jamāʿī) 
 
The idea of collective ijtihād is not new. During the twentieth century Muslim scholars 
including Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), Muhamad Iqbal (d. 1938), al-
Qaraḍāwī (b. 1935), and the Moroccan scholar Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī (b. 1935)19 began to advocate 
for a type of ijtihad different from the more individual ijtihad of past centuries. Rashīd Riḍā 
criticized Islamic fiqh and called for a collective ijtihād to be practiced by “those occupying 
leading positions in commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture; politicians; and respected 
journalists.”20 Muhammad Iqbal also called for an assembly of legislators made out of other 
members of the Islamic society in addition to Islamic religious scholars, ʿulamāʾ, to undertake the 
responsibility of collective ijtihād instead of individual ijtihad.21 Of these scholars, al-Khamlīshī 
was one of the first to argue for women’s place in this new collective ijtihad, calling for an elected 
body of experts composed of both men and women. 
In May 2013, I had the privilege of conducting an interview with al-Khamlīshī. I asked his 
opinion on the state of fiqh, ijtihād and the role of women in the Moroccan Mudawwana, and al-
Khamlīshī explained his belief that the lack of women’s participation in legislation, and lack of 
freedom in marriage, divorce, and other legal issues stemmed from the current state of Islamic fiqh 
and ʿulamāʾ. Al-Khamlīshī stated that today, ijtihād among Muslims is in a debilitated state.22 He 
stresses that for centuries ijtihād has always been an individual endeavor. This individual endeavor 
according to al-Khamlīshī, cannot deduce general rulings to govern hundreds of millions of people 
throughout the world in general matters, nor in matters of Islamic law. This individual ijtihād 
produced many negative rulings which became obstacles in the lives of people in general and in 
the lives of women in particular. Al-Khamlīshī attributes these obstacles to many elements. He felt 
that a number of obstacles were placed deliberately by experts in Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) 
who put forth impossible terms under which an individual could qualify as a mujtahid.23 Al-
Khamlīshī maintains that these experts believe that the mujtahid is one who interprets the eternal 
divine law to the masses.24 According to al-Khamlīshī, other experts maintain that the mujtahid 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 33. For more on the term taqlīd see Hallaq, Authority, 86-120. Contrary to many scholars, The Egyptian 
born scholar Mohammad Fadel considers taqlīd another method of ijtihād. Mohammad Fadel, "The Social Logic of 
Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhataṣar," Islamic Law and Society 3: 2 (1996), 193-233. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 49-53; Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍāʼ, Tafsīr al-Manār, 22 vols. (Beirūt: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1970), 
5: 181. For the Opinion of al-Qaraḍāwī, see Yūsuf al- Qaraḍāwī̄, al-Fiqh al-islāmī bayna al-aṣāla waʾl-tajdīd 
(Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1999), 41. 
20 Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought ,49-53; Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-manār, 5:181.  
21 Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 53-54; Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 164-65. 
22 From May 2013 interview. See also al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd al-dirāsāt al-fiqhīya: The Stagnation of Fiqh Studies 
(al-Rabāṭ: Dār Nashr al-Maʿrifah, 2010), 3-21. 
23 Ibid, 5-7. 
24 Al-Khamlīshī, Al-Ijtihād: taṣawwuran wa-mumārasa: Ijtihād: Imagination and Practice (al-Rabāṭ: Dār al-Nashr 
al-Maʿrifah, 2010), 11-16. To support his argument, al-Khamlīshī cites the Muslim scholar al-Shāṭibī who maintains 
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reports on God’s will and intentions; therefore, he interprets what God intended.25 This belief, 
according to al-Khamlīshī, has inflicted a great deal of harm on Islamic law. “It is almost 
impossible for any individual to claim the knowledge of every legal and social issue no matter how 
much knowledge this individual possesses from the Qurʾān, the Sunna or other fields,” he says.26  
Al-Khamlīshī was not the first jurist to criticize Islamic fiqh and call for a new type of 
ijtihād. Contemporary Egyptian scholar al-Qaraḍāwī also followed in Riḍā’s footsteps by calling 
for a new collective type of ijtihad formed of Muslim ‘ulamāʾ while retaining the individual ijtihad 
as a parallel practice.27 
Al-Khamlīshī states that social issues differ from one century to another and from one 
region to another, even between Muslim states. To say that one individual is able to even be aware 
of all of these customs, let alone understand them all with respect to divine law (Sharīʿa) is a 
dangerous conclusion. Secondly, as a result of the reason described above, al-Khamlīshī believes 
that by stating that the mujtahid interprets the divine law, the mujtahid’s opinion thus becomes 
absolute and unable to be challenged.28 This leaves opinions deduced in the early Islamic centuries 
(between the seventh and tenth centuries) to become primary sources for debates in the twenty-
first century. Thirdly, due to the definition of a mujtahid as the only one who may interprets the 
divine law, the mujtahid is therefore able to deduce a ruling on any specific or general legal issue.29 
More importantly, al-Khamlīshī argues that a ruling deduced by a mujtahid, whether the ruling 
concerns permitting or forbidding an action, is considered divine ruling (ḥukm ilāhī), and not 
merely a singular interpretation of the divine message, for instance.30 As a result, the followers of 
the mujtahid held on to these opinions, considering them part of the Divine law (Sharīʿa).31 With 
time, and after the formation of the madhāhib, by the end of the tenth century, people started to 
consider these madhāhib to be part of the divine law, according to al-Khamlīshī.32  
Al-Khamlīshī says that this blind belief in the madhāhib resulted in freezing the process of 
ijtihād and the gate of ijtihād.33 He says that despite the change in customs and traditions over the 
past ten centuries, fiqh has not changed.34 Instead people held on tightly to the old personal 
opinions of jurists and considered them among the eternal part of Sharīʿa.35 “That is why we see 
many Muslims today claiming that Muslim states are not applying Sharīʿa and instead use new 
laws that are foreign to Islam and are imported from the West.”36 These laws are considered by 
many to be a threat to Islam and Sharīʿa.37    
Al-Khamlīshī’s response to these complicated issues is to move away from the old ijtihād 
and the stagnation of fiqh. He also suggests a new type of ijtihād, which he calls “collective ijtihād” 
                                                          
that muftīs/mujtahids were the heir of prophets. See Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, Muwāfaqāt, ed. Mashhūr Ḥasan 
Maḥmūd Salmān, 6 vols. (Saudi Arabia, al-Khubar: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 5: 253-57.  
25 Al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 6-7; idem, al-Ijtihād, 16; al-Shāṭibī, Muwāfaqāt, 5: 253-57. 
26 An interview conducted in May 2013.  
27 Al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 41. 
28 Al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 62-64. 
29 An interview conducted in May 2013. See also al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 6-7. 
30 Al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 59. 
31 Ibid., 1-90. 
32 Ibid., 7.  
33 An interview conducted in May 2013. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See also al-Khamlīshī, al-Ijtihād, 12-18. 
36 An interview conducted in May 2013. 
37 Ibid.  
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(al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī).38 Al-Khamlīshī maintains that “the local society has the exclusive right to 
decide on which of the past rulings may be considered law. This may be done through institutions 
appointed by the local society or elected committee members.”39 He strongly recommends that the 
old restrictions on the qualifications of the mujtahid be eliminated.40 The mujtahid, according to 
al-Khamlīshī, must be an expert in certain fields or an intellectual from within the local Islamic 
civil society.41 In this collective ijtihād, says al-Khamlīshī, men and women experts in Islamic 
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), as well as experts in law, science and other fields such as medical and 
scientific fields are to be included.42 Al-Khamlīshī’s suggestion to include men and women experts 
on social and legal issues from outside the ʿ ulamāʾ in an effort to hear from all aspects of Muslims’ 
society rather than keeping legal matters solely in the hands of the ʿulamāʾ. Thus al-Khamlīshī’s 
ultimate aim was to break the monopoly of religious jurists over Islamic family law.  
Al-Khamlīshī criticizes the ʿulamāʾ for holding on to the old fiqh while customs have 
changed dramatically from one place to another through more than ten centuries. He also blames 
the stringent and strict qualifications of the mujtahid on the eponym of the Shāfiʿī madhhab, 
Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820).43 According to al-Khamlīshī, al-Shāfiʿī stipulated that a 
mujtahid must possess the following qualifications, 
… [t]he knowledge of the Qurʾān and Sunna of the Prophet. The mujtahid must know 
which legal issues Muslims reached consensus (ijmāʿ) over and which issues they 
disagreed over (ikhtilāf). The mujtahid must be aware of the opinions of previous 
predecessors (salaf). He must be able to practice legal analogical deduction based on 
the reveled texts. He must also possess knowledge of the commands of the Qurʾān, its 
prescribed duties and ethical discipline, its abrogating and abrogated, its general and 
its particular rulings, and must be able to interpret the ambiguous verses. He must 
possess full knowledge of the Arabic language.44  
Al-Khamlīshī emphasizes that, due to the strenuous conditions made by al-Shāfiʿī, it was almost 
impossible for anyone to become a mujtahid and, instead, these conditions were responsible for 
producing imitators (muqallidūn) instead of genuine mujtahids.45   
Al-Khamlīshī asserts that, due to the changes that occurred in every society throughout the 
centuries, there must be renewal and reform to the old rulings. To him, this must be conducted 
according to the universal Qurʾanic law which states, “who (conducts) their affairs by mutual 
Consultation.”46 Al-Khamlīshī interprets this verse to mean that any ijtihād must be a collective 
type of ijtihād. In addition, according to al-Khamlīshī this type of ijtihād must be conducted 
continuously throughout the ages and in every region using the consensus of the Muslim 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Al-Khamlīshī specifies the qualifications mentioned by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388). See 
al-Khamlīshī, al-Ijtihād, 149-53; idem, Jumūd, 158-59. For the qualifications of the mujtahid, see al-Shāṭibī, 
Muwāfaqāt, 5: 41-58. For the qualifications mentioned by al-Shāfiʿī, see Muḥammad b. Idrīs, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 
ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, 1979), 508-10. 
41 Al-Fākhūrī, Qānūn al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣīya, 104-06. 
42 Ibid. 
43 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 510. 
44 Ibid., 509-10.  
45 Interview in May 2013. Although al-Shāfiʿī might have placed strenuous conditions to become a mujtahid, al-
Ghaẓālī (d. 505/1111), on the other hand, seemed to have watered down the requirement of a mujtahid. See Hallaq, 
“Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, 6. 
46 Q. 42:38. 
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community as a guide only and not a source of law.47 He is of the opinion that there must be 
consultation with men and women experts  as well as common people so as to deduce new rulings 
that are both pragmatic and, at the same time, able to resolve the issues of the day.48 He also 
maintains that, while rulings in rituals (ʿibādāt) may differ from one jurist to another and from one 
madhhab to another, transactions (muʿāmalāt) may not be based on different opinions.49 To him, 
there must be one law within the state that everyone can respect and obey.50 Contrary to the 
opinions of other Arab Muslim intellectuals like al-Qaraḍāwī, who calls on Muslims to practice 
ijtihād only on issues without clear evidence, and only if Muslim jurists did not reach consensus 
(ijmāʿ) on these issues, al-Khamlīshī is of the opinion that ijtihād may be practiced for all issues 
of transaction, regardless of rulings previously reached by a consensus of jurists.51 Therefore, he 
calls for new type of ijtihād so as to eliminate the ʿulamāʾs monopoly over fiqh and many 
transactions which harm the individual Muslim.  Commenting on the role of the faqīh al-Khamlīshī 
questions his role by asking the question,  
What qualifies the faqīh to make a ruling regarding the age of marriage? Marriage laws 
require certain experts: lawyers, sociologists, and medical experts who need to be 
involved in making such decisions. A faqīh’s opinion is only his opinion and must not 
be considered a law. The faqīh is nothing but a spiritual advisor (wāʿiẓ) and not a 
lawmaker. His opinion is one among many individual opinions, but never a law.52 
Therefore, al-Khamlīshī limits the role of jurists and considers their role to be that of a spiritual 
advisor rather than a peer of the legislators. He also restricts the legal rulings of the past jurists and 
considers these rulings to be mere opinions only and not part of the state’s law. Al-Khamlīshī was 
not the first jurist to criticize Islamic fiqh and call for a new type of ijtihād. Contemporary Egyptian 
scholar al-Qaraḍāwī also followed in Riḍā’s footsteps by calling for a new collective type of ijtihad 
formed of Muslim ‘ulamāʾ while retaining the individual ijtihad as a parallel practice.53 
 
Al-Khamlīshī on the Issue of Consensus (Ijmāʿ) 
 
Consensus between Muslim scholars, though, has been something of a thorny issue for 
centuries. While we do not know the exact date that the consensus was reached, it is safe to say 
that the term was readily used by the eighth century.54 As a general rule, consensus is applied to 
legal rulings that are mentioned in either the Qurʾān or Sunna, but are ambiguous or are otherwise 
not mentioned in the religious texts at all. Consensus is defined as the agreement of Muslim jurists 
(mujtahids) after the death of Prophet Muḥammad at a certain generation over a legal religious 
ruling deduced by jurists, or mujtahids.55 
                                                          
47 Interview with al-Khamlīshī in May 2013. See also al-Khamlīshī, al-Ijtihād, 13-36. 
48 An interview conducted in May 2013. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The opinion of al-Qaraḍāwī can be found in al-Khamlīshī, al-Ijtihād, 178-79. 
52 From an interview with al-Khamlīshī conducted in May 2013. See also al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 160. 
53 Al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 41. 
54 Jonathan Brown, Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 
168; George F. Hourani, “The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam) Studia Islamica, 21 (1964), 19-20.  
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During the twentieth-century a number of Muslim scholars raised questions concerning the 
authority of jurist consensus. Rashīd Riḍā, Muhammad Iqbal, al-Qaraḍāwī, and Fazlur Rahman 
were among the first Muslim scholars to levee criticism against the ancient method of consensus, 
calling for reformation of this outdated legal source. While Qaraḍāwī called for the establishment 
of a body of jurists and learned men of Islamic law, Riḍā and Iqbal argued that this elected body 
should also include legislatures with expertise in professions from outside the ʿulamāʾ.56 However, 
a number of scholars have raised arguments in defense of the traditional authority of jurist 
consensus. For example, Fazlur Rahman considers consensus to be a versatile and necessary 
obstacle in Islamic law, contending that “ijmāʿ was regarded as absolutely authoritative” in its 
ability to establish law in the past, present, and future,57 while Fazlur Rahman describes consensus 
as “the most potent factor in expressing and shaping the complex of belief and practice of the 
Muslims.”58 
Al-Khamlīshī is also critical of the consensus (ijmāʿ) of jurists as a source of law. This 
consensus, according to al-Khamlīshī, while started in the eighth century C.E., could not be 
generalized as a source of law to all Muslims living throughout the world in different centuries.59 
Rulings which were the outcome of ijmāʿ may not be considered laws for Muslims living in Spain, 
Africa and the Middle East, says al-Khamlīshī. He goes on to say that even if some of the ʿulamāʾ 
have agreed on certain rulings, these rulings are considered their own opinions and are open for 
reforms and changes.60 Al-Khamlīshī of the opinion that all legal transactions are open for ijtihād 
even if jurists have reached consensus over the issues. The ijmāʿ, to al-Khamlīshī, must also be 
restricted by place and time. Therefore, the consensus of people in Algeria, according to al-
Khamlīshī, may be different from that of the Muslims in Morocco. More importantly, ijmāʿ 
according to al-Khamlīshī must include the opinions of men and women alike. To him women 
must participate in legislating and reforming Islamic laws just like men do. Al-Khamlīshī’s views 
regarding consensus are not without a foundation. Most jurists’ of the four Sunni schools of law 
agreed that, once consensus is reached, it may not be challenged by later jurists.61 More 
importantly, jurists reached consensus that legal rulings in the Qurīān and Sunna of the Prophet 
may be abrogated while rulings based on jurists’ consensus may not.62 In so doing, Sunni jurists 
gave more authority to jurists’ consensus than they allowed the Qurʾān or the Sunna in legal issues.  
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 49-54. For the opinion of al-Qaraḍāwī, see al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Fiqh al-islāmī, 41; 
Iqbal, 164-65; Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:181. 
57 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 74. 
58 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 74-75. 
59  From the interview with al-Khamlīshī. See also al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 58-62. 
60 On the issue of ijmāʿ and how it contributed to persisting rulings which discriminate against women, see Scott C. 
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Journal of the American Oriental Society, 129:2 (2009), 237-58. 
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Conclusion 
 
The work of al-Khamlīshī was considered a radical diversion from many of the other 
traditionalist ʿulamāʾ in the Arab-Muslim world. Unfazed by the mounting opposition, al-
Khamlīshī challenged the outdated fiqh along with the work of many past jurists when he said that 
he considered all legal transactions to be open for ijtihād. This was not only a challenge for 
Islamists and the traditionalist ʿulamāʾ in Morocco, but also to the work of almost all Muslim 
jurists throughout the Islamic world. Unlike many of the Muslim jurists who called for opening 
the gate of ijtihād on certain issues on which past jurists had not yet deduced rulings, al-Khamlīshī 
called for revisiting and challenging all of the old rulings, including those concerning issues about 
which jurists claimed that they had already reached a consensus.  Further, al-Khamlīshī broke away 
from other ʿulamāʾ and intellectuals in calling for a new form of ijtihād—a collective ijtihād (al-
ijtihād al-jamā‘ī). This type of ijtihād includes men and women who are professionals and experts 
from fields related to the topic of any law that is to be reformed—scientists, lawyers, social 
servants—as well as religious scholars. Thus, al-Khamlīshī may be considered the first Muslim 
intellectual to allow women to participate in the process of legal ijtihād alongside men.  
For the first time, women participated in ijtihād and their opinion was heard and taken 
seriously, and men’s long-standing monopoly over Islamic fiqh was broken. Unlike other 
collective ijtihād called for by other Muslim jurists like Riḍā, Iqbal, and al-Qaraḍāwī, for example, 
al-Khamlīshī’s ijtihād is regional and confined to the demands of local issues within each 
individual state. By allowing expert men and women to take part in the process of ijtihād, al-
Khamlīshī undermined the entire establishment of ʿulamāʾ. Furthermore, and contrary to the 
opinions of many jurists (fuqahāʾ), al-Khamlīshī considered the faqīh a religious, spiritual advisor 
and not a law maker. This radical statement by al-Khamlīshī was instrumental in granting 
intellectual men and women from various fields permission to act as part of the process of 
lawmaking in Morocco.  
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